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Does competition spur productivity? And if so, how? These have long been regarded as central
questions in economics, and major ﬁgures in the profession, such as Schumpeter (1942), Stigler
(1957), and Arrow (1962), have weighed in on the debate. The extent of competition can be
inﬂuenced by policy decisions, so understanding how competition impacts productivity and, in
turn, living standards is of more than academic importance.
To fully answer these questions of whether, and how, an increase in competition impacts
productivity, two issues must be addressed. First, at a basic level, we must deﬁne what we mean
by an “increase in competition.” Second, given a (well-deﬁned) change in competition, and given
that we ﬁnd productivity changes, we must understand the mechanisms through which competition
impacts productivity. Both issues present substantial challenges.
To see the diﬃculties involved with the ﬁrst issue, deﬁning an increase in competition, consider
this example. Suppose an industry is initially protected by a government-imposed barrier that blocks
the entry of large-scale, highly productive ﬁrms. (Think of recent eﬀorts to block Wal-Mart’s entry
in some urban locations.) Initially, many small ﬁrms are in the industry. Imagine that the barrier
is lifted and that one large, highly productive ﬁrm enters and drives out a multitude of small, less
productive ﬁrms. Suppose further that researchers analyzing this issue, as is often the case, have
ready access to market share data but have no information on government policies toward entry.
In this case, many researchers would deﬁne this industry as having become less competitive, given
the increase in measured market concentration. But the change in concentration is being driven
by the elimination of an entry barrier, which can sensibly be viewed as an increase in competition.
This example is not anomalous, as we discuss further below, and illustrates the diﬃculty of using
industry statistics such as concentration to deﬁne what we mean by increases in competition.
Now we turn to the diﬃculties with the second issue, namely, understanding the mechanismsthrough which competition impacts productivity. Suppose we ﬁnd that after a well-deﬁned increase
in competition, productivity increases both because of some ineﬃcient plants closing and because of
surviving plants increasing their productivity. The theory of how competition leads to reallocation,
of the closing of ineﬃcient plants, is well understood. But despite having attracted much interest over
many years, the theory of how competition can make a given plant more eﬃcient is not fully worked
out. Leibenstein (1966) made a name for himself on this issue, not by developing a coherent theory
but rather in coming up with a label (albeit an awkward one!) that stuck. Leibenstein asserted
that monopolists suﬀer from X-ineﬃciency, meaning they have low total factor productivity (TFP),
and that exposure to competition eliminates this disease.1 The conundrum that is diﬃcult to crack
is this: if a monopolist could produce the same output with less inputs, why doesn’t it do so and
pocket the savings as proﬁt? As yet, there is no leading workhorse model, one that is ready to be
taken to the data, that fully ﬂeshes out the mechanisms through which exposure to competition
leads to TFP increases within a plant.
This essay reviews the literature examining the link between competition and productivity
that makes progress toward both issues raised above. The papers are mostly industry studies,
focusing on particular industries in great detail.
Regarding the ﬁrst issue–clarity on what is meant by an increase in competition–the bulk
of the papers discussed consider industries that have undergone major changes in their competitive
environment. In most of the papers, there is little doubt that the industries faced an increase in
competition. These papers use direct information on the competitive environment faced by ﬁrms,
rather than trying to indirectly infer the degree of competition from observations on concentration
statistics or price-cost margins, which can be misleading.
The changes in competitive environments discussed below include the Holmes and Schmitz
1Early on, Stigler (1973) noted that Leibenstein was oﬀering only a deﬁnition and not a coherent theory.
2(2001) study of how railroad competition inﬂuenced water transportation productivity, the Schmitz
(2005) study of how competition from Brazilian iron ore inﬂuenced U.S. iron ore productivity, the
Syverson (2004) study of how market size inﬂuences competition and productivity in concrete man-
ufacturing, the Matsa (2009) study of how Wal-Mart’s entry into a retail market inﬂuenced existing
retailer’s productivity, the Dunne et al. (2008) study of how foreign competition inﬂuenced U.S.
cement manufacturing productivity, and the De Loecker (2009) study of liberalization of the Belgian
textile trade. In all these studies, and most of the others discussed below, increased competition
raised industry productivity.
Consider next the second issue–understanding the mechanisms through which productivity
is impacted. In nearly all the studies, increased competition led to productivity gains at surviving
plants–what we could call gains in X-eﬃciency, or what the literature calls within-plant gains. In
many of the studies, these X-eﬃciency or within-plant gains amount to a large fraction of overall
industry productivity gains. Hence, we are left with the conundrum above: how do we understand
or explain these gains? Many of the papers tackle this issue head-on by asking what changed inside
these surviving plants to make their productivity increase? The papers have studied the nitty-gritty
of resource allocation within plants. The goal is that by generating a set of facts about how increased
exposure to competition impacts resource allocation within plants, we can use these facts to guide
further development of theory.
What has been found? In the case of U.S. iron ore, for example, Schmitz (2005) argues that
it was investment in new management practices that led to the majority of the productivity gains.
He reaches this conclusion, in part, through a detailed analysis of labor contracts specifying what
workers were permitted to do, and through an analysis of whether or not machinery was being fully
utilized, before and after the threat of Brazilian competition. In the Wal-Mart case, Matsa (2009)
argues that existing retailers made new investments in inventory control and the like when Wal-Mart
3showed up in town.
Many of the studies have found, then, that when plants faced increased competition, they
made substantial investments to raise productivity. But importantly, note that in most of these
changes in the competitive environment, the scale of the plant’s market was not increasing but was,
if anything, decreasing. So, it was not the possibility of a larger market that drove the increases in
investment (the usual scale eﬀect of Arrow).
If not increases in scale, then what drove investment? We’ll argue that it was likely that the
cost of investment fell as competition increased. To understand this, we use an extended concept
of the cost of investment. Typically, the cost of investment or innovation is simply the cost of
a new machine, or the cost of the scientists on staﬀ. But there is often an opportunity cost of
investment too. Consider the iron ore case. Plant managers understood that attempts to introduce
new management practices would likely meet stiﬀ resistance (from unions). So, if they attempted
to adopt the practices, strikes were likely, meaning that plants would not produce output for some
period of time. Hence, one cost of adoption was the opportunity cost of lost proﬁts during this strike
period. This opportunity cost was tied to the price of the product. If the price was very high, the
opportunity costs were high. Hence, more competition, meaning lower prices, meant opportunity
costs fell, making adoption more likely. Start-up problems can arise in adopting any technology (not
just management practices), such as with new inventory control technology in retailing. Holmes et
al. (2008) give many real-world cases and label them as “switchover disruptions.” With switchover
disruptions, and with the possibility that a plant does not produce its entire output for a period of
time, one cost of investment is the opportunity cost of lost proﬁts from delayed or lost sales. And
competition inﬂuences this cost.
In the next section, we present a model that illustrates the two issues highlighted above.
First, we discuss the various meanings of an increase in competition in the model. Second, we
4discuss the channels for how a change in competition can impact productivity. We distinguish
between channels that are well understood and other channels that are a black box. We also use the
model to discuss limitations of reduced-form regression approaches that use concentration measures
or price-cost margins as a means of measuring competition. Section 3 discusses industry studies
that have examined the impact of competition on productivity. In Section 4, we look at trade
liberalization studies. Section 5 concludes.
2. SIMPLE INDUSTRY MODEL WITH CHANGES IN THE COMPETITIVE
ENVIRONMENT
In this section, we present a simple model of an industry. With the model we illustrate in a more
formal way the two issues raised in the introduction. First, we use the model to provide explicit
examples of what we mean by changes in the competitive environment. We do this by changing
parameters in the model that relate to the extent to which ﬁrms have to compete with each other.
Second, we use the model to trace channels through which changes in the competitive environment
can impact industry productivity.
In the last part of this section, we use the model to comment on empirical approaches based
on concentration measures or proﬁt measures, rather than well-deﬁned changes in the competitive
environment.
2.1. Productivity in a Simple Industry Model
Consider a model of an industry in which there are two locations,  ∈ {12}.L e t = () be the
demand at location  when the price at  is . The parameter  scales up demand proportionately,
so () can be thought of as per capita demand. Suppose there is a cost to transfer one unit of the
industry product between the two locations. The transfer cost is the sum of a physical transportation
cost that must be incurred plus a tariﬀ that must be paid on shipments moving from one location
5to the other. Let  denote the transportation cost and  the tariﬀ (or duty). At each location
there is a set of potential entrants to the industry. Potential entrants face a ﬁxed cost of entry,
w h i c hi st h es u mo fas e t u pc o s t( e . g . ,s o m ek i n do fe n g i n e e r i n gd e s i g ne x p e n d i t u r e s )p l u sa ne n t r y




 denote the setup cost and entry tax faced by potential entrant  at
location . Note that this structure allows for diﬀerent potential entrants to face diﬀerent costs. For
example, it allows for potential entrant  to be blocked by a prohibitive entry barrier, 

 = ∞,w h i l e
another potential entrant 0 faces no legal impediments to entry, 

0 =0 . Potential entrants also







units of output with 

 units of labor. The parameter 

 allows productivity to vary across entering
ﬁrms. Assume that all ﬁrms pay the same wage, normalized to equal one. Finally, suppose entry
and production decisions are modeled as a simultaneous-move Cournot game. That is, each ﬁrm
takes as given the entry and output decisions of all the other ﬁr m sw h e nm a k i n gi t so w nd e c i s i o n ,
and production is allocated across the two locations in a market-clearing fashion.
We will think of changing the competitive environment of the industry by varying the para-
meters of the model just described. Let a particular competitive environment be indexed by . For a
given competitive environment ,l e t be population at location , 

 the physical cost of entry
and 

 the entry tax,  the transportation cost and  the tariﬀ,a n dﬁnally 

 the productivity
parameter of plant  at . (For simplicity, (·) and (·) are held ﬁxed across environments.) Select
an equilibrium of the simultaneous-move Cournot game for each environment. We will compare
the productivity across the equilibria of diﬀerent competitive environments. As is well understood,
there are potentially multiple equilibria in this class of models. However, this is a side issue that
we will ignore to keep the discussion brief. (It can be ﬁnessed with comparative statics of sets of
equilibria.)
For the equilibrium under competitive environment ,l e t denote the set of ﬁrms that








 ) denote the equilibrium employment
and output of a given entering ﬁrm. We can deﬁne average productivity in environment  as total





































 is the total volume of shipments between locations in environment  that incurs the
transportation cost . We include as inputs labor, setup costs, and transportation costs, but not
entry taxes or tariﬀs.
In comparing industry productivity across competitive environments, separating out three
sources of productivity diﬀerences is useful. The ﬁrst source of change is often called the reallocation
source in the literature, beginning with Bailey et al. (1992). In particular, suppose that on account
of a change in the competitive environment, a ﬁrm with low productivity parameter  is replaced
by one with a high productivity parameter. Everything else the same, this will tend to raise overall
industry productivity. For example, Hsieh & Klenow (2007) show that part of the reason TFP
is higher in the United States compared to China is that the U.S. economy does a better job of
allocating production to plants with high  compared to China.
The second source of change is the scale eﬀect. For simplicity, suppose all ﬁrms have the
same marginal cost and the same ﬁxed cost of entry. If, on account of a change in the competitive
environment, one ﬁrm produces the same amount as two ﬁrms previously, everything else the same,
industry productivity increases. That’s because one ﬁxed cost expenditure replaces two ﬁxed cost
expenditures in the denominator of (1). It is well understood that with free entry (no entry taxes),
plants might be ineﬃciently small, relative to the degree of scale economies. Mankiw & Whinston
(1986) is the standard reference for “excess entry” in the above model (in which too many ﬁrms
enter and carve up a ﬁxed market too many ways). The scale eﬀect also shows up in the famous
Arrow (1962) paper on the incentive to innovate, which showed that a ﬁrm with a larger market
7size is more likely to pay a ﬁxed cost to lower marginal cost.
The third source of change is the X-eﬃciency or within-ﬁrm eﬀect. A change in the compet-
itive environment might change the productivity parameter  or the ﬁxed cost (and is unrelated to
a change in the ability of the ﬁrm to enjoy scale economies). That is, for two diﬀerent environments,








 or both. Although the two other sources of
productivity change can be explicitly modeled, this X-eﬃciency change is a so-called black box.
One of the primary goals of the papers discussed below is to delve into this black box to determine
t h es o u r c e so ft h ew i t h i n - ﬁrm eﬀect.
2.2. Some Changes in the Competitive Environment
Now we go through examples of changes that make the environment more competitive. Let  = 
indicate the initial regime (where  indicates that this regime is more monopolistic) and  = 
indicate the new regime (where  indicates that this regime is more competitive).
Entry Restrictions
First consider government-imposed entry restrictions. Suppose that in the initial regime, there is
no restriction on ﬁrms at location 1 from entering the industry, but entry is blocked to ﬁrms at
location 2. (This is equivalent to setting the entry tax at location 1 to 
1
 =0 , and at location 2
to 
2
 = ∞ for every ﬁrm .) In the initial equilibrium with this restriction, suppose that a large
number of “small” ﬁrms enter at location 1. In the new environment after the restriction is lifted
(i.e., 
2
 =0 ), suppose one extremely productive ﬁrm enters at location 2 that supplies most of the
industry output, displacing most of the small ﬁrms at location 1.2 This is the situation described
in the introduction.
This change in the competitive environment will certainly lead to a change in industry pro-
2We could think of  =0  so that there really is no “location,” and that ineﬃcient ﬁrms at location 1 were able to
construct an entry barrier to a very eﬃcient ﬁrm.
8ductivity through the reallocation component. It possibly may change industry productivity through
the scale eﬀect. And the within-ﬁrm channel might come into play as well. Facing competition from
the new large ﬁrm at location 2, the small ﬁrms at location 1 might respond, and the parameters for








 or both. (See our discussion of Matsa
2009 below.)
This change in the competitive environment–elimination of an entry restriction–can best
be thought of as an experiment that increases competition. But note that in the new regime,
concentration (as measured by the Herﬁndahl index, for example) will actually be higher and,
potentially, proﬁts as well. We will return to this example below when we discuss approaches that
measure changes in competition through changes in concentration and proﬁt margins rather than
underlying environment changes.
Technological Change
Obviously, technological change can directly increase industry productivity. But here, our focus is
on how technological change can indirectly change industry productivity, through a change in the
competitive environment.
In particular, in the example above, we can reinterpret the fall in the entry barrier as some-
thing that occurs through a technological advance rather than a change in policy. That is, we can
interpret the real resource cost of entry as falling from inﬁnity to zero (instead of the entry tax falling
from inﬁnity to zero). Thus, there is no change in the discussion of how industry productivity can
be impacted. Later when we discuss the impact of the advent of railroads in the 19th century on
water transportation productivity (Holmes & Schmitz 2001), this is the model that we will have in
mind.
9Tariﬀ and Transport Cost Reductions
Next consider a change where either the transportation cost or the tariﬀ duty is reduced in a
signiﬁcant way, so the cost of shipping goods between the locations declines,  +  +.
Suppose that in the equilibrium of the initial, high transfer cost environment, there are a
large number of small ﬁrms at location 1 with low values of 1
. And suppose there is one large
eﬃcient ﬁrm at location 2 with high 2
. The small ﬁrms at location 1 are initially protected from
the big eﬃcient ﬁrm at location 2 because of the transfer cost barrier. After the signiﬁcant decline
in transfer costs, the small, ineﬃcient ﬁrms at location 1 are no longer protected.
Like the example where entry restrictions were eliminated, the eﬃcient ﬁrm at location 2
might displace the ineﬃcient ﬁrms at 1, raising industry productivity through reallocation. There
might also be scale eﬀects. And, as discussed in the previous example, there might be within-ﬁrm




 ,a st h eﬁrms respond to the increase in competition.




 , might in principle
be of suﬃcient magnitude that the ﬁrms at location 1 retain their market share, so in the end, ﬁrm
2 makes no shipments to location 1. In this case, the change in competitive pressure at location
1 from potential imports from location 2 is responsible for inducing changes in productivity. Yet
there is no diﬀerence in the measured volume of imports. This is analogous to how in Holmes &
Schmitz (1995), a reduction in tariﬀs leads to increases in productivity, even though there are no
international trade shipments in equilibrium after the tariﬀ reduction. It is also basically what
happened when Brazil threatened U.S. iron ore producers (Schmitz 2005).
Changes in Market Size
Next consider changes in market size, in particular changes in the market scaling parameters so
that 1  1 and 2  2.A ni n c r e a s ei nm a r k e ts i z ei m p a c t st h ec o m p e t i t i v ee n v i r o n m e n t
because, given the existence of entry costs, in larger markets there is greater equilibrium entry (as
10in the Sutton 2007 “exogenous ﬁxed cost” case).
Beginning with Bresnahan & Reiss (1991), there is an extensive literature examining how
changes in market size impact pricing and entry behavior. (For a more recent strand of this literature,
see Pakes et al. 2007.) Since a central focus of this literature is the estimation of ﬁxed costs of
entry and entry policy rules, these models can be used to evaluate how changes in market size can
impact industry productivity through the scale eﬀect discussed above. In contrast, the within-ﬁrm
channel discussed above, and how that might be impacted from the increased competition of larger
markets, has not been a focus of this literature.
Syverson (2004) is a leading example of a recent paper analyzing productivity using changes
in market size. This paper can be interpreted as focusing on the reallocation source discussed above.
As discussed below, in large markets, production is reallocated from ineﬃcient plants to eﬃcient
plants, but in small markets this doesn’t necessarily happen.
2.3. Approaches Based on Concentration or Proﬁts
The above discussion lists a variety of ways in which the underlying environment in an industry can
become more competitive. The empirical studies we discuss starting in Section 3 involve a change in
the competitive environment that can be found somewhere on the list above (or are a modiﬁcation
of something on the list). The studies are very clear about the nature of the environmental change
and explicitly document it.
There exists an alternative approach that looks at changes in concentration or changes in
price-cost margins, rather than changes in the underlying competitive environment. In particular,
lower industry concentration and lower price-cost margins are regarded as proxying more compe-
tition, and these are compared with statistics on productivity. We believe this approach has two
serious drawbacks.
First, even if changes in concentration or proﬁt margins over time are being driven by changes
11in the underlying competitive environment, it is not necessarily the case that these measures will
go in the right direction. To be more clear about this, suppose the underlying data generation
process consists of repeated observations of the model described above, across diﬀerent industry
observations that are diﬀerent draws for the entry tax, i.e., diﬀerent barriers to entry. An approach
that associates lower concentration and lower proﬁt margins with a more competitive environment
might get things right sometimes. But it won’t other times. To make the point for concentration,
recall the example above where a decrease in entry barriers led to an increase in concentration (note
that this is not classical measurement error). To make the point for proﬁt margins, note that in
many cases, monopoly rents get captured by employees of ﬁrms rather than shareholders. If entry
barriers are reduced, this might lead to lower rents for employees instead of lower proﬁts. (See
Salinger 1984 for a discussion of this point.)
Second, measures of concentration and proﬁt can change over time for reasons unrelated to
changes in the competitive environment. Again, take repeated observations of the above model as
the data-generating process, but now keep the competitive environment ﬁxed across observations,
e.g., let there be no diﬀerences in entry taxes across observations. But do allow for diﬀerent draws
of the vectors of 

 parameters across observations. Let’s say that for one draw, i.e., a particular
industry observation, ﬁrms are all similar in having a mediocre level of productivity 

.T h e s eﬁrms
share the market equally, and there is not much in the way of rents (or proﬁts) given that the ﬁrms
are all similar in productivity. Now suppose for another industry observation, everything is the
same except there is also a ﬁrm in the industry with a huge 

 draw relative to all the mediocre
ﬁrms. It follows that in this second industry there will be a huge ﬁrm with huge proﬁts, making the
industry highly concentrated and highly proﬁtable. But all of this is happening with no change in
the competitive environment.
This second point is the famous criticism made by Demsetz (1973) almost 40 years ago about
12the interpretation of regressions of industry proﬁt on industry concentration. He was criticizing the
structure/conduct/performance literature initiated by Bain (1951). When Demsetz was making his
point, he was referring to a cross section of diﬀerent industries. But his point is equally valid for
looking within an industry over time. That is, it doesn’t help matters to get a panel of industries
and throw in industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Concentration can increase over time within an industry for the
same Demsetz reason that concentration can vary across industries.
Moreover, if we look at industry proﬁt margins, there are numerous additional kinds of shocks
that lead to ﬂuctuations over time in proﬁt within an industry that are unrelated to changes in the
underlying competitive environment. For example, Lambson (1992) shows how shocks to demand,
technology, and input prices can lead to short-run ﬂuctuations in the return to industry-speciﬁc
capital.
A well-known paper that uses concentration and proﬁts to measure competition is Nickell
(1996). Although this paper updates Bain, on the whole it is a direct descendent of Bain. One
update is the use of ﬁrm-level panel data instead of an industry cross section. The main regression
is of ﬁrm-level productivity on industry variables like industry concentration, on a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect,
a n do naﬁrm’s own market share in a period. The paper interprets a ﬁrm’s own market share as
some kind of inverse measure of the competitive environment faced by the ﬁrm. The arguments
made above about the usefulness of industry-level measures of concentration apply equally well at
the ﬁrm level. To take an example from above, a reduction in a tariﬀ m a yi nt h ee n dh a v en oi m p a c t
on a ﬁrm’s market share but may still have a huge impact in changing the competitive environment.
A well-known recent paper that relates innovative activity to industry-level price-cost margins
is Aghion et al (2005). Using data from the United Kingdom, the paper estimates a relationship
using ﬁxed industry and time eﬀects. What distinguishes its approach from the earlier Bain tradition
is the use of instruments to control for the endogeneity of proﬁt margins. Speciﬁcally, the paper
13uses as instruments the timing of various policy changes, such as privatizations taking place under
Margaret Thatcher, antitrust actions, and trade policies. These policies are all interesting and likely
do impact the competitive environment. However, in the paper, all of the individual eﬀects of these
policies are buried under the hood in a ﬁrst stage estimate, with all eﬀects in the end forced to run
through the price-cost margin. Our concern about the use of the price-cost margin goes beyond the
paper’s concern that it is endogenous; we are worried that changes in the variable don’t satisfactorily
correspond to changes in competition. For example, there is evidence that the privatizations in the
UK led to transfers of monopoly rents away from workers. (These took place in the form of greater
eﬀort per worker through employment cuts rather than wage cuts; see Haskel & Szymanski 1993
and Haskel & Sanchis 1995.) So, price-cost margins may not have changed, or may have even gone
up, as a result of the privatizations.
3. STUDIES OF INDUSTRIES FACING COMPETITION
In this section, we’ll review a series of papers that have examined industries which underwent
changes in their competitive environment, like those discussed in the theory section above, where
there is little doubt that competition increased.
3.1. The Coming of Railroads and Productivity in Long-Distance Water Shipping
Here we discuss competition in an industry from the development of a new, competing technology.
Holmes & Schmitz (2001) examine the impact on freight transportation by water (water shipping
for short) from the development of railroads. They discuss evidence from both the 19th and 20th
centuries and document that railroads increased the competition faced by water shipping, and that
this led to signiﬁcant productivity improvements in water transportation.
We ﬁrst argue that there was a strong tendency for monopoly or market power to develop in
water shipping, and that railroads broke up some of this market power. Then we turn to productivity.
14We start with a historical example. Imagine a farmer, say, in 1850, wishing to transport
bales of cotton from the U.S. South, say, very close to the Mississippi River in Louisiana, to the
U.S. Northeast. Trains had not come to the South. The most natural way to make the shipment
would be a short wagon ride to the Mississippi River, then down the river to New Orleans, and
then on to the Northeast over water. Few other options were available. One could ship up the
Mississippi River, then the Ohio River, then an Ohio canal, and then the Erie Canal, and so on.
Another option would be to use other ports in the Gulf of Mexico, though this would entail shipping
the bales by wagon to other more distant rivers. Given that these other options were so expensive,
having a monopoly on traﬃc coming through the port of New Orleans would be very lucrative. The
incentives to create a monopoly were great, and monopolies were created in the port.
One such monopoly was on supplying labor in the port of New Orleans. As early as the
1850s, there were strong unions of dockworkers in New Orleans. Holmes and Schmitz document the
very high wages and entry fees to join the unions. It was also claimed that price gouging took place
in warehouses.3
Consider what the advent of railroads meant. With railroads, it was much easier for farmers
to use other ports in the Gulf. Shipments by land to other rivers were now much cheaper (rail
was much cheaper than wagon). And, of course, shipping directly over land to the Northeast, and
bypassing water altogether, was now an economic possibility. Railroads, then, provided a signiﬁcant
threat to the monopolies created in the port of New Orleans. And the threat weakened the market
power of groups like unions in the New Orleans port. Moreover, one sees that railroads broke up
monopolies in ports throughout the 19th and 20th centuries by oﬀering shippers an opportunity to
use other ports or to bypass water altogether.
Now let’s turn to the impact of railroad competition on productivity in the ports. Before
3In the late 19th century, business leaders in New Orleans decried the high prices charged by warehouse owners
and claimed that the prices were diverting cargo to railroads and other ports (see, e.g., Hester 1896).
15that, a brief digression is in order. As part of the deals struck by unions in ports, work rules often
required that machinery could not be used in loading or unloading ships, or only in limited ways.
Holmes and Schmitz give examples in New Orleans in the 19th century. Another type of work rule
in ports in the 19th and 20th centuries concerned multiple handling of cargo. When longshoremen
removed a pallet from the deck of a boat and moved it to the dock, a rule required that longshoremen
unload the pallet on the dock. Only then could a trucker reload the cargo onto his pallet. The same
rules held for loading material onto boats. The trucker would have to put cargo on the dock to then
be loaded by longshoremen onto their pallets. Pallets could not go from the truck to the boat (see,
e.g., Kossoris 1961 and Killingsworth 1962).
These types of work rules obviously lowered labor productivity. One could claim that they
increased leisure too. But a key point is that the rules reduced capital productivity. Unloading and
loading boats took much longer because of the rules. Hence, boats stayed in port much longer than
necessary.
Now back to the railroads’ impact on productivity. Railroads not only led to lower wages
in ports but also led to the dropping of many of these restrictive work practices; that is, they
increased productivity. The historical record makes it clear that longshoremen decided to respond
to railroad competition and did so by dropping work rules, such as the multiple handling of cargo.
In discussing U.S. West Coast longshore rules in the 1930s to 1960s, and how they were made looser
in the 1960s, Killingsworth and Kossoris cite railroad competition on intercoastal traﬃca sam a j o r
reason why new, less restrictive labor agreements could be reached. It’s interesting to note that in
negotiations about how much longshoremen should be compensated to drop some work rules, the
union demanded part of the gains that came from ships being able to leave ports more quickly than
before.
As additional evidence that longshoremen responded to rail competition by increasing pro-
16ductivity, it was often the case that longshoremen had diﬀerent rules for working ships that went
between ports that could be serviced by railroads (say, Los Angeles to Seattle) and those that could
not (say, Los Angeles to Hong Kong). Work rules were relaxed on those ships that competed with
trains. Hence, these ships spent less time in port.
Finally, a historical note. In his famous analysis of the contribution of railroads to economic
growth, Fogel (1964, 1979) assumed that railroad competition had no impact on the prices or
productivity in water shipping. This was an important assumption in his estimation of railroads’
beneﬁts to growth. This assumption was not even approximately correct: railroads had very large
impact on both prices and productivity in 19th (and 20th) century water shipping.4
3.2. When the Brazilians Nearly Came: Productivity in U.S. Iron Ore Manufacturing
Here we look at competition in an industry when a new competitor shows up, in part because of
lower transportation costs. In the early 1980s, Brazilian iron ore producers showed up to compete
with U.S. iron ore manufacturers for the market around the lower Great Lakes (around Chicago
and Cleveland). This was a huge surge in competition for U.S. iron ore producers (who were
located in Minnesota and Michigan) (see Galdon-Sanchez & Schmitz 2002 and Schmitz 2005). U.S.
productivity surged with the advent of competition.
We ﬁrst argue that there was a strong tendency for monopoly in iron ore manufacturing and
that Brazil broke it up. Then we turn to productivity.
The tendency for market power in iron ore manufacturing comes from the fact that iron ore
can be produced at only a few locations and that transport costs are large. For example, imagine
iron ore deposits located near some steel mills. And suppose the next closest deposits of iron ore are
very far away. Suppose demand for iron ore at the local steel mills is inelastic. A quantity  will
4Water shipping, of course, impacted prices and technology in railroads too. And when trucks were developed, it
impacted technology in both water and rail shipping (as they inﬂuenced it). Cappelli (1990) gives interesting examples
of unions in the railroad industry that agreed to have diﬀerent (more ﬂexible) work rules on trains that competed with
trucks than on trains that did not compete with trucks (e.g., trains carrying coal).
17be demanded at a price of  or less and zero otherwise. Let  be the local production costs of iron
ore. To keep things simple, suppose iron ore is free at the distant location but costs  to transport
to the local steel mills. Suppose  .
If the local deposits are owned by a large number of producers (i.e., there are a large number
of independent mines), then price competition will mean the local ore will sell for  =  ( indicates
local iron ore). But if somehow the price could be raised to  (assuming  ), there would be a
proﬁt ( − ) per unit. So, if some type of monopoly can be arranged, it may well be lucrative.
This is a reasonable abstraction for thinking about the U.S. iron ore industry. Its deposits
were located primarily in Minnesota. These were fairly close to the large steel mills in the lower
Great Lakes (around Chicago and Cleveland). The cost of transportation from the next closest
major deposits (in Brazil) to Chicago was much higher than the transport costs for U.S. producers.5
As we said, if monopolies could be arranged they might be lucrative, and they were indeed
arranged. Many groups (i.e., input suppliers) in the state of Minnesota recognized the logic of
market power sketched above. Many groups organized to capture some of the returns to this market
power. First, governments at many levels (such as the state, county, township, and school board)
charged the mines very high taxes on each ton of iron ore produced. Second, a powerful union
charged high prices for labor. We can think of all these groups as adding to the costs of iron ore, of
adding to , and pushing the price of iron ore toward  = .
In the early 1980s, Brazil broke up much of the market power in U.S. iron ore production.
At this time, Brazil oﬀered to sell iron ore in Chicago at prices well below the price of Minnesota
iron ore. Brazil was a huge competitive threat. What changed to make it a threat? There were
signiﬁcant reductions in transport costs in the 1980s. Another reason was that Brazil lost markets
5There were, in fact, major deposits of iron ore in eastern Canada, close (relative to Brazil) to U.S. deposits. But
there was a common union across the U.S. and Canadian mines, the United Steelworkers of America. This union was
a monopoly supplier of labor to the mines in the whole region.
18elsewhere.6
Turning to productivity, there was little labor productivity growth in Minnesota iron ore
before the 1980s, and then it surged with Brazilian competition. Labor productivity doubled in
a few years in the mid-1980s. Though there is no published industry TFP measure in the United
States, Schmitz makes arguments that it too increased a lot.7
What were the sources of these industry productivity gains in the 1980s? Recall our taxonomy
regarding sources of gains. First, competition could have closed ineﬃcient mines. In fact, some
Minnesota mines were closed, yet their productivity was about the same as the industry average. A
formal labor productivity growth decomposition shows that over the decade 1980—90, when industry
labor productivity doubled, closing plants accounted for none of the productivity increase.
Second, competition could have changed the scale of the mines, to scales with higher produc-
tivity. In fact, the scale of mines that remained opened did not change much.
Third, the competition could have led to increases in productivity at the continuing plants. In
the productivity growth decomposition above, productivity gains within continuing plants accounted
for the vast majority of the 1980—90 gains (95 percent of the gains).
What are we to make of this last result? Note that in the mines that remained open, pro-
ductivity was ﬂat in the period before the crisis and soared afterward. We might be tempted to say,
then, that the increase in competition led to changes inside the plants that increased productivity.
But let’s play devil’s advocate here. Competition meant that some mines closed. So, maybe we are
just seeing the mines that had the best prospects for the future (including the best productivity
growth prospects). This is a diﬀerent type of selection than above, when we asked if the 1980—90
6Still another reason is that (see below) U.S. productivity had not been increasing for years, while Brazil’s produc-
tivity was.
7As mentioned in the note above, Canada’s iron ore industry had the same union as the U.S. industry. The labor
productivity record in Canada looks nearly identical to that in the United States. For Canada, there is an industry
TFP series, and it also grows dramatically in the 1980s.
19productivity growth was driven by closing mines that had low levels of productivity in 1980. This
is a selection on expected growth over 1980—90.
How can we prove, then, that competition was responsible for the signiﬁcant productivity
growth in continuing mines, and not some selection process? One way to proceed is to go inside the
p l a n t s ,s ot os p e a k ,a n dﬁnd out what actually drove the productivity gains. And then we ask, was
it competition that drove these changes? Schmitz (2005) identiﬁes the changes (some of which are
given below) and argues that they were likely due to Brazilian competition.
What were some of these changes? Let us give some examples; more are in Schmitz (2005).
These mines ran 24 hours a day, so there were three shift changes. They were huge open pit mines,
many square miles around, and each shift change required that men working on the trucks and
blasting equipment throughout the mines had to be picked up and replaced with new men. During
the crisis in the mid-1980s, the companies sought to change the rules on these shift changes, seeking
to establish “eyeball-to-eyeball” crew relief. Before the crisis, small vans would drive around the
mine picking up the men at the end of their shift. These men would be returned to a central location.
Next, the vans would take out the men for the new shift. Hence, all the equipment would be idle for
a not insigniﬁcant portion of the shift. The companies asked the union to go to eyeball-to-eyeball
crew relief, so that the new men would be in the vans when the old shift men left their equipment.
The term comes from the fact that they would pass each other eyeball-to-eyeball.
The union resisted the change, and the company brought it to arbitration. The arbitrator
said that output would be larger with eyeball-to-eyeball crew relief and ruled for the companies.
This change led to increases in TFP; all productivities were increased.
Another type of work rule was repair-job classiﬁcations. Before the crisis, repair staﬀ were
assigned a certain classiﬁcation (such as welder, pipeﬁtter, and so on, amounting to 30 or more
classiﬁcations). Workers in a classiﬁcation could only do certain repair jobs. Suppose a machine
20became jammed and inoperable. First, the machine operator was precluded from repairing it. And
only repair workers assigned to ﬁxing this part of the machine could repair it (moreover, the operator
could not help). Even if this was a simple job that other repair staﬀ could accomplish, they were
not allowed. This, of course, meant larger repair staﬀs than needed. But it also meant that broken
machines were down much longer than necessary. The rules reduced capital productivity and energy
productivity (in these mines, energy is always “on”).
During the crisis, the union agreed to change many repair work practices. First, machine
operators were now permitted to conduct minor repairs on their machines. Second, repair workers
were allowed to conduct a broader range of jobs. The impacts on repair staﬀsw e r ed r a m a t i c .
Whereas before the crisis, repair staﬀs amounted to about 50 percent of the total workforce at
mines, after the rule changes repair staﬀs fell to about 25 percent of the workforce. And this was
at a time when total workforces were falling by half!
With these changes in work practices, productivity surged in Minnesota mines. As a result,
the Brazilian competition was met head on, and the Brazilians did not take over the lower Great
Lakes market.
The above discussion illustrates that in the 1980s, in the face of competition and (potentially)
shrinking markets, the industry made investments (in new management practices) to increase pro-
ductivity. The earlier history of the industry, as we’ll now discuss, also illustrates that ﬁrms with
(potential) market power may be wary of investing.
In Minnesota, in the 1910s and 1920s, it was clear that the local natural iron ore deposits
would be depleted before too long. What would remain was a hard rock called taconite (which
contained a low percentage of iron). An engineer at the University of Minnesota, Ed Davis, developed
a technology to make the taconite into high-grade iron ore pellets. The technology required major
investments. In the 1930s, Davis presented U.S. steel company executives with the results of decades-
21long research into making pellets. It was clear that whatever company built the infrastructure to
make this new iron ore would have great market power, since the closest competing iron ore was
thousands of miles away (from Chicago-area steel plants). But the U.S. steel executives balked at
making the investments. They were worried about being taxed and so forth. Davis then went to the
Department of Economics and the Law School at the University of Minnesota, and with their help
drafted (and passed, in 1941) a new law that limited taxation on taconite.8 The steel executives
were satisﬁed that the law put enough constraints on taxation, and the taconite pellet industry was
developed in the 1950s. This was the industry threatened by the Brazilians in the 1980s.
This episode illustrates that if a ﬁrm has (potential) market power, it may be wary of investing
in new technology. If a ﬁrm has no competitors, and if input suppliers to the ﬁrm can establish their
own market power, they can then extract the surplus from the ﬁrm’s innovation (since in raising
input charges, there is no fear that competitors will capture the market). Given this incentive,
suppliers will endeavor to do so. This is opposite the idea, attributed to Schumpeter, that market
power is needed for investment. Although agreements can be reached (such as the new tax laws
above) to limit these problems, often they are not, and even when they are reached, they are often
n o tt h a te ﬀective. In fact, we see that some of the fears of the U.S. steel executives came to pass,
as the towns and unions extracted so much surplus that Brazilian iron ore became competitive in
Chicago.
3.3. Markets of Diﬀerent Sizes and Concrete Manufacturing Productivity
Here we look at how competition varies across markets in concrete manufacturing. Concrete is
shipped only very short distances. Hence, the scale of production is often large relative to market
size. In rural areas and small cities, there may be room in the market for only one or two producers.
8Davis (1964) discusses in detail the eﬀorts to convince steel executives that the law was not “a ‘come on’ to get
taconite plants built, after which the tax base would be increased” (p. 99).
22In large urban areas there is likely room for a much larger number of producers. Producers in larger
markets then face more competition than producers in small markets.
In an interesting paper, Syverson (2004) develops this idea and determines how market size
(and therefore competition) impacts the distribution of productivities. The paper shows that plants
tend to be more productive in larger markets because the bottom tail of low productivity plants
tends to be weeded out in larger markets. The interpretation is that low productivity plants can not
survive in larger markets because they would have to compete with the very high productivity plants
that can typically be found in such places. We expect high productivity plants in large markets
because with so many random entry draws in large markets, at least some will turn out to be high
productivity. In contrast, small markets may have no very high productivity plants, and so a low
productivity plant can survive (see also Collard-Wexler 2010).
3.4. When Wal-Mart Came to Town
In U.S. retail markets, the entry of Wal-Mart provided a signiﬁcant increase in competition to
existing retailers. Matsa (2009) ﬁnds that after Wal-Mart’s entry, existing ﬁrms improve their
productivity. In particular, Matsa looks at the impact of competition on supermarkets’ provision of
quality, measured by product availability. He shows that competition from Wal-Mart led competing
supermarkets to reduce stockouts (when products become unavailable to shoppers) by up to 24
percent. He concludes that the reductions in stockouts were brought about by new investments
(e.g., in computers tracking inventories), and not through changes in product mix (across products
with diﬀerent stockout rates). As in the iron ore case, in the face of (likely) shrinking markets (since
Wal-Mart was not leaving), ﬁrms made investments to increase productivity.
233.5. When Almost Everyone Came: Productivity in U.S. Cement Manufacturing
U.S. cement producers faced a dramatic increase in competition in the middle 1980s (see Dunne
et al. 2008). This industry had faced little foreign competition for decades. Then, in the 1980s,
many countries (e.g., Australia, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Greece, Venezuela, and others) oﬀered to sell
cement at steep discounts to U.S. cement producers, and many did. The increase in competition
was due in part to improvements in the technology to transport cement over water. But the primary
factor was likely that U.S. cement industry TFP had been falling for decades, while it had been
increasing around the world. In response to the competition, cement plants made investments that
led to a doubling of labor productivity, and a huge increase in TFP, in a few years.
We ﬁrst argue that there was a strong tendency toward monopoly in cement manufacturing
and that foreign competition broke it up. Then we turn to productivity.
Though cement is shipped at farther distances than concrete, it is still shipped at fairly short
distances over land (the majority is shipped within a couple of hundred miles of the plant). Hence,
in some markets, the eﬃcient scale of production is fairly big relative to the local market size. There
might be only one or two plants supplying a local market. Hence, there is a tendency for market
power. And, in any case, a strong national union developed in the late 1950s and 1960s that acted
as a monopolist in supplying labor to the industry.
This market power was exploited by various groups in the industry. As in iron ore manufac-
turing, U.S. states (such as Texas) taxed the quantity of cement produced. The union also charged
very high wages. Wages were comparable to those of U.S. autoworkers (see Northrup 1989).
In the middle 1980s, foreign cement producers broke up much of this market power. Before
the 1970s, there were virtually no imports into the United States. Then, in the 1980s, imports
surged, reaching about 30 percent of production in many years. These imports broke up much of
the monopoly in U.S. cement manufacturing. The union, in fact, disintegrated in 1984 (again, see
24Northrup 1989). What changed in the 1980s? There were improvements in transportation. But
probably more important, U.S. producers had become less productive than most producers in the
world, as we now describe.
Turning our discussion to productivity, industry TFP was falling, by roughly 10 percent, in
the United States in the two decades before the increase in imports.9 In the decade after imports
surged, industry TFP increased by about 35 percent.
What were the sources of these industry productivity gains in the 1980s? Consider labor
productivity. Over the period 1982—87, industry labor productivity grew roughly 40 percent. In
a formal labor productivity growth decomposition, productivity gains within continuing plants ac-
counted for a signiﬁcant majority of the 1982—87 gains (roughly 75 percent of the gains). Given
that there are only a small number of plants in the industry–on the order of 125 to 150 plants–we
cannot, for disclosure concerns, report the gains due to closing plants. But we can say, of course,
that it cannot be bigger than 25 percent of the gains, since the within-plant term is 75 percent.
As i g n i ﬁcant share of the industry productivity gain is, then, within-plant gains. Again, we
might be tempted to say that the increase in competition led to changes inside the plants that
increased productivity. But, as above, perhaps the phenomenal within-plant growth is driven by
selection, and that we are just seeing the plants that had the best prospects for the future (including
the best productivity growth prospects). Again, one way to proceed is to go inside the plants and
ﬁnd out what actually drove the productivity gains. Dunne et al. (2008) identify signiﬁcant changes
in these plants that increased productivity (some of which are given below), and argue that they
were likely due to competition.
What were some of these changes? Let us give some examples; more are in Dunne et al.
(2008). Before the crisis, ﬁrms were not able to terminate an employee because the ﬁrm purchased
9In contrast, productivity had been growing signiﬁcantly in most countries.
25an e wm a c h i n e ,ﬁgured out a way to better organize work, and so on.10 With the import surge, this
restriction was dropped, and plants could ﬁre redundant workers.
Before the crisis, the rights to repair jobs at the plants were divided among departments.11
Hence, if a particular repair job was needed, and that department was busy, the repair job had to
wait. Broken machines were down much longer than necessary. The rules reduced capital produc-
tivity and energy productivity (in these plants, energy is always “on”). These restrictions were also
dropped.
As in the iron ore and Wal-Mart cases, the cement industry, in the face of competition that
shrank markets, made investments (here, in new management practices) to increase productivity.
The history also illustrates that market power can reduce innovation. Recall the contract
clause that forbade plants to ﬁre workers because the plant bought a new machine or ﬁgured out a
better way to organize production. This clause was introduced into contracts only after the union
had built enough power to force its inclusion (in 1965). Again, the clause, everything else equal,
limited innovation and investment in the industry. But note that the union would not have pushed
for its inclusion if there had not been market power in the industry. If foreign competition had been
a threat, then there would be no sense in slowing industry innovation.
3.6. When Belgium Liberalized Textiles
When a country liberalizes its trade regime by reducing tariﬀso ni m p o r t s ,t h i sc l e a r l yi n c r e a s e s
competitive pressure on domestic ﬁr m s ,a si nt h em o d e la b o v ei ft a r i ﬀs are reduced. De Loecker
(2009) studies the impact on productivity on Belgian textile manufacturing of reductions in import
10For example, the following clause appeared in nearly all cement contracts before the crisis: “Employees will
not be terminated by the Company as the result of mechanization, automation, change in production methods, the
installation of new or larger equipment, the combining or the elimination of jobs.”
11For example, one ﬁnds clauses like these: “[W]hen the Finish Grind Department is completely down for repairs,
the Company will not use Repairmen assigned to the Clinker Handling Department on repairs in the Finish Grind De-
partment” and “Repair work on internal combustion engines will be performed by the Materials Handling Department
except for minor repairs or adjustments.”
26quotas on textile products. He ﬁnds that industry productivity increases following the liberalization.
One concern, of course, is that the mix of textile products in Belgium changed as quotas were lifted,
and that this changing mix might explain the measured productivity increase. By using very detailed
data on textile products, De Loecker argues that productivity did in fact increase in the industry,
though by less than would be estimated if one ignored the changes in product mix (see further
discussion below).
3.7. When the U.S. Government Closed a Cartel
In this section, we look at the impact of an increase in competition resulting from the U.S. gov-
ernment closing a cartel. We’ll show that there was a large increase in productivity, and that a
good part of the increase was from the shutting down of ineﬃcient producers and the entry of more
eﬃcient ones (see Bridgman et al. 2009).
During the Depression, the U.S. government allowed industries to cartelize. One industry
that cartelized was the U.S. sugar manufacturing industry. Although most cartels lasted only a few
years (because the Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional), the sugar cartel lasted 40 years,
from 1934 to 1974. In 1974, with a surge in world sugar prices, the cartel lost its support and was
ended.
The cartel agreement called for no new ﬁrms to enter the industry and gave existing ﬁrms
production quotas each year. These provisions alone did not protect incumbent farmers. For
example, if a ﬁrm chose to relocate its production quota from one region to another, this would
obviously hurt incumbent farmers (those in the initial region). Hence, the cartel agreement also
prohibited the entry of new farmers. The result of this agreement was to lock in patterns of regional
production.
Over the period 1934—74, there were forces making the far West a less attractive, and the
Midwest a more attractive, location to manufacture sugar. For example, the price of land in the
27West rose faster than that in the Midwest. Hence, once the cartel was ended and the provisions
locking in regional patterns of production eliminated, there was a very large change in the regional
pattern of production. Production in the U.S. far West, including California, declined dramatically.
Production in the Midwest, including North Dakota and Minnesota, soared. Here, the source of
the gain in productivity was closing ineﬃcient producers (really, entire regions) and entry of new
producers.
3.8. Did ADM Spur Intel to Innovate?
Thus far, we have looked at industries that have faced a dramatic increase in competition as a result
of some event, such as Wal-Mart coming to town. Another important way to learn about the impact
of competition is to run experiments in models. There is now an emerging literature doing just this.
Goettler & Gordon (2009) examine the PC microprocessor industry, where Intel and ADM
make up the vast majority of the market. They ask whether Intel (which is much larger than
ADM) was pushed to innovate by having ADM as a competitor. They estimate a model of industry
innovation, using the paths of prices, innovation, and so on, that were observed with both ﬁrms in
the market. They then run sensible experiments, such as asking what would happen to Intel’s rate
of innovation if ADM were precluded from the market. In their model, an Intel monopoly would
have led to more innovation than the actual duopoly. Hence, here as opposed to most of the studies
we have seen, competition leads to less investment.12
Other studies following a similar approach are those by Copeland & Shapiro (2010) on technol-
ogy adoption in personal computers, Macieira (2009) on competition in the supercomputer industry,
a n dX u( 2 0 0 8 )o nt h eK o r e a ne l e c t r i cm o t o rm a n u f a c t u r i n g .
12Note that in the model, the research productivity of Intel does not depend on whether ADM is in the market or
not. There is no idea that a monopolist might become ineﬃcient. Of course, as we suggested above, there is no simple
or generally accepted way to include this possibility in a model. We mention this only because it may actually be
important (and something to consider later).
284. STUDIES LOOKING AT TRADE LIBERALIZATIONS AND COMMON
MARKETS
In the last decade or so, there has been a surge in papers studying the impacts on industry produc-
tivity of trade liberalizations and market openings. What distinguishes the studies discussed in this
section (from those above) is that they typically examine a large number of industries simultaneously
and do not (for obvious reasons) examine details of industries.
For our purposes, we divide the studies into two groups. We ﬁrst discuss studies of unilateral
tariﬀ reductions, whereby a country reduces its tariﬀs against the world (while the tariﬀsi tf a c e s
are unchanged). In this case, it is likely that the potential market for any plant is shrinking (or
not increasing). In this sense, the situation such a plant faces is like that of plants in the iron ore,
Wal-Mart, and cement studies above.
We then brieﬂy discuss studies of liberalizations whereby all countries reduce tariﬀs together,
as when common markets are formed. In this case, the potential market for most plants is likely
increasing.
4.1. Trade Liberalization
There is a large, recent literature that studies unilateral tariﬀ reductions. One strength of this
literature is that, in general, it has examined instances of signiﬁcant liberalization. It is easier to
determine the impact of competition when changes are big and are not overwhelmed by other noise.
A second strength of the literature is that much is based on census micro data where productivity can
be calculated at the plant level. The literature has typically found that industries facing the greatest
reduction in tariﬀs (or the greatest openness to trade when tariﬀs fell) have faster productivity
growth than industries facing the least reduction in tariﬀs. This arises both through reallocation
(exit of ineﬃcient plants) and through productivity increases within existing plants. So, like the
studies of speciﬁc industries in the section above, these papers ﬁnd within-plant productivity gains
29even as markets shrink.
One of the earliest studies of unilateral tariﬀ reductions was that by Tybout et al. (1991),
which focused on the impact of the signiﬁcant trade liberalization in Chile in the late 1970s. Pavcnik
(2002) also studied this case. Pavcnik distinguished between those industries that tended to be
nontraded (initially having low imports and exports) from industries that were import competing
(initially having some imports). Pavcnik showed that over the liberalization period, industry-level
productivity of the import-competing industries grew relative to the nontraded industry on the
order of 25 percent. As we discuss further below, part of this is attributable to the exit of ineﬃcient
plants, and part is a within eﬀect.
Pavcnik’s study of Chilean trade liberalization has spurred studies on other (unilateral) trade
liberalizations, including Indonesia (Amiti & Konings 2007), Columbia (Fernandes 2007), India
(Sivadasan 2009), and Brazil (Ferreira & Rossi 2003). These studies’ ﬁndings are similar to those
of Pavcnik’s.
Ruiz & Utar (2009) examine the impact of productivity of Mexican (maquiladoras) manufac-
turing plants when China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Chinese plants
provided a competitive threat to these Mexican plants in the United States, and the threat increased
with WTO entry. The authors ﬁnd that the Mexican plants that were most susceptible to Chinese
competition had the greatest productivity gains on China’s WTO entry.
Treﬂer (2004) is a leading paper examining the impact on labor productivity of Canadian
plants of the tariﬀ reductions that grew out of the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement.13 This is a
particularly clean case to look at, since the tariﬀ changes were not accompanied by other reforms,
and so the impact of the tariﬀsi sn o tc o m m i n g l e dw i t ht h ee ﬀects of other changes.14 Treﬂer found
13These are not unilateral tariﬀ reductions like those above, but Treﬂer has information on both sets of tariﬀsa n d
can control for U.S. tariﬀs against Canada.
14A caveat about analyses of trade liberalizations taking place in developing countries (such as the case of Chile
above) is that other reforms typically take place at the same time.
30the tariﬀ reductions led to substantial increases in labor productivity both at the industry level and
within plants.
It’s worth taking a moment to describe how the literature typically calculates the within-plant
productivity gains from trade liberalizations. There are two steps. In the ﬁrst, studies typically
derive estimates of a plant’s TFP, say ˆ , for plant  at time . In the second, they then run simple
regressions such as
ˆ  =  +  + · (tariﬀ ) +  (2)
where (tariﬀ ) is the tariﬀ protection enjoyed by plant  at time ,a n d and  are ﬁxed plant
and time eﬀects. Nearly all studies ﬁnd 0, suggesting a within-plant eﬀect.
In the ﬁrst step, signiﬁcant econometric issues are involved in estimating plant TFP, ˆ ,
and the literature has made good progress overcoming them. For example, suppose the production
function is Cobb-Douglas,
 = ()()(),
for inputs , ,a n d (employment, materials, and capital). Given outputs and inputs, with
estimates of ˆ  =( ˆ ˆ ˆ ), we can back out an estimate of the TFP variable ˆ  for ﬁrm  at time
. But there are signiﬁcant econometric issues in estimating the production function coeﬃcients
correctly. Olley & Pakes (1996) and subsequent papers such as Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) propose
methods for estimating  that address the econometric issues of simultaneity in the choice of inputs
and selection from entry and exit. De Loecker (2009) extends these methods by taking into account
that markups are endogenous.
In the second step, given the estimates ˆ , the literature then estimates the regression (2).
At this point, the literature tends to stop worrying about the selection issues it was concerned with
during the ﬁrst stage when the input coeﬃcients  were estimated. These papers estimate  by
31comparing plants over time, i.e., plants that survive from one period to the next. But we expect
survival to be related to changes in productivity over time. If tariﬀs are decreasing over time, this
selection can lead to a negative estimate of  with ordinary least squares (OLS) even when  =0 .15
We are not sure how important this selection is when estimating the regression (2). As
discussed above in the studies of particular industries, it would be nice to explicitly link the changes
in competition (here, tariﬀ reductions) with changes taking place within the surviving plants besides
productivity (such as the changes in labor contracts in the iron ore and cement industries). This
would show that the productivity changes taking place within the plants would likely not have
taken place without the reduction in tariﬀs. Some studies are starting to look inside the plants
(e.g., examining if the mix of products produced in plants changes with trade liberalization).
As we said, most of the literature has found that as tariﬀs are cut, plants become more
productive. One study that ﬁnds the opposite is Konings & Vandenbussche (2008). The paper
examines the relationship between antidumping protection and productivity. When a ﬁrm receives
antidumping protection, punitive duties are imposed on imports in the ﬁrm’s industry from par-
ticular countries (those found guilty of dumping the industry product). The paper has two main
results. First, ﬁrms getting antidumping protection tend to be less productive than ﬁrms that are
s i m i l a ri no t h e rr e s p e c t s( c a l lt h e s eo t h e rﬁrms “peer ﬁrms”). Second, the productivity gap between
the protected ﬁrms and their peers actually declines (but never disappears) after the protections
are imposed. This is an intriguing ﬁnding because it goes in the opposite direction of the results
reported above. The results, at ﬁrst sight, suggest that adding trade protection (thereby reducing
competition) raises productivity. But now consider the selection of ﬁrms that win antidumping
cases. These invariably are ﬁrms that are getting hammered in the marketplace by imports. The
within-productivity gains that these ﬁrms experience could very well be driven by the increased
15 Pavcnik (2002) includes a dummy variable for exit in a regression that is analogous to (2), but there is no reason
to expect this correction to lead to a consistent estimate of .
32competition they face rather than the increased protection they win in trade commission ﬁlings.16
4.2. Common Markets
Although most of the studies of trade liberalization have been unilateral tariﬀ cuts, there are some
studies of situations where countries reduce tariﬀs together. This typically happens when common
markets are formed. McGrattan & Prescott (2009) look at the aggregate labor productivity of
European countries before and after they join the European Union. They show that the productivity
of joining countries falls relative to the United States before membership in the union and then begins
to increase after joining (see their Figures 1—3). The impact of increased competition may well have
been one source of the productivity increases. The impact of bigger markets may have been another
(see Bottasso & Sembenelli 2001, Bustos 2010).
5. CONCLUSION
We have reviewed a new literature that has examined industries experiencing dramatic changes
in their competitive environment. Nearly all the studies found that increases in competition led to
increases in industry productivity. Plants that survived these increases in competition were typically
found to have large productivity gains, and these gains often accounted for the majority of overall
industry gains.
There remains a big challenge to understand these X-eﬃciency or within-plant productivity
gains following increased competition. There have been some interesting papers to be sure (such as
Schmidt 1997 and Raith 2003), but no model has been accepted as a workhorse model.
Some interesting ideas have come out of the detailed industry studies above–ideas that may
help in building such a workhorse model. One idea is that one cost of investment is the opportunity
cost of lost proﬁts from delayed or lost sales when adopting technology (if there are switchover
16For example, the U.S. cement industry ﬁled, and won, antidumping cases in the 1980s when imports were surging
in the United States. It’s pretty clear that the impressive productivity gains in the industry were driven by the
competition, not by the antidumping cases the industry won.
33disruptions). Since competition reduces this opportunity cost, it is a force for investment (even if a
plant’s potential market is shrinking). Holmes et al. (2008) have formalized these ideas.
Another phenomenon (unexpectedly) emerged from these studies. It was found that ﬁrms
that had the opportunity to create markets in which they would have great market power were
reluctant to do so. The executives realized that if they built the plants to produce the goods, they
would be susceptible to very high tax rates from various levels of government, and also to very
high wages from unions. And this would be the case precisely because the ﬁrm would have no
competitors.
The case illustrates another reason why monopoly may be bad for investment and innovation,
since if a ﬁrm has no competitors, then its input suppliers have a great incentive to invest in their
own market power and thereby extract surplus from the ﬁrm’s innovations.17 This ﬁnding is similar
to results stressed in the hold-up literature (see also Van Reenen 1996, who shows in a panel of ﬁrms
that innovation is usually followed by increasing wages).
17See Boldrin & Levine (2008), who discuss other reasons why market power may be a threat to innovation.
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